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THE ONE, THE LIMIT AND INFINITY IN PHILOSOPHY OF IOANE PETRITSI 
In his preface to the commentaries on Proclus' "Elements of Theology" Petritsi speaks about 
the importance of terminological exactitude in translation of philosophical works and complains that 
Georgian translators before him did not take enough care on that, sometimes having rendered different 
concepts with the· same terms, which "terribly hindered" Petritsi in his efforts to translate such works. 
For the sake of example of how painstaikingly one should translate the philosophic concepts, Petritsi 
provides his own newly coined Georgian terms "midmogoneba" and "gagoneba"-standing for Greek 
"dianoia" and "noesis"-distinguishing thus discursive thought of soul from instantaneous grasp of in-
tellect. Petritsi then gives his translation of the Greek term ''noeton", that is, the object of understand-
ing, at the same time explaining an ontological law that an object of understanding is always higher to a 
subject who understands it. At this point Petritsi depicts Proclus' whole Neoplatonic metaphysical hier-
archy of the incorporeal universe in terms of subjects and an objects of understanding. According to this 
hierarchy the intellect is "noeton" for the soul, the True Being "noeton" for the intellect, the henads for 
the True Being, and the First Limit and the First Infinity for the henads. Finally, the ultimate object of 
understanding is "the supreme One and Good1, whom our desire of honouring Him called also Father" 
(7.24-8.7)2. Here, as well as in other passages, Petritsi definitely identifies Proclus' One with the Father 
in the Christian Trinity. In the present paper I shall demonstrate that in Petritsi's universe the second 
metaphysical level, that of the Limit and Infinity, is related to the two remaining hypostases of the 
Trinity, respectively to the Son and the Holy Spirit. I shall show different metaphysical functions of the 
One, the Limit and Infinity in Petritsi 's understanding and his peculiar theory of the "three Ones". 
The Limit 
The First Limit in Petritsi's system is called several times "the idea of ideas". As a source for this 
expression he refers to Aristotle: "The First Limit of beings, called by Aristotle 'the idea of ideas"' 
(§10,37,19; cf.also§29,78.14-15)3; and to the Eleatic Stranger from Plato's "Sophist": "the First Limit, 
the super idea, or as the Eleatic Stranger calls him, ' the idea of all ideas'4 (95,145.9-11). The Limit is 
1 Petritsi here differs, at least from the terminological point of view, from Proclus who does not apply the term ''noeton" to the 
One: "[TO l v] ou8' VOT]TOV ij VOfpC>V, a>J..' VTTOOTQTLKOV Kal nilv VOT]T WV Kal T WV VOfp<i\V Eva8wv (In Parm. 1069, 
22-23)." Cf. also Michael Psellus: "tr),:i'iv b &as- Kal Tot'J VOTJTOt'J Kal Tot'J ai.iTovoriTov ETTEKnva (Psellus, 145). Petritsi 
may follow Plotinus, who describes the One as VOTJTOV for the subsequent, that is to say, for the vovs- - Enneads, 
V.4.(7).2.2-1 I. 
2 In calling the One "Father", Petritsi is in tune with Plotinus and Porphyry and diverges from the later Neoplatonists, as Pro-
clus and Damascius, who reserved the name "father" to the prime aspect of the intelligible triad, "the highest point ofvof.s'" 
(Cf. J.M. Rist, Mysticism and Transcendence in later Neoplato11ism. In: "Platonism and its Christian Heritage", Variorum, 
London, 1985, p.218.) 
3 cf. Aristotles, De Anima, Book G, 432a2: kai o nous eidos eidon: "The intellect is the form of forms". 
4 Cf. Sophist,253 D-E: " ... Then who can do that intuitively perceives a) one Form extended everywhere throughout many, 
where each one lies apart, and b) many forms differing from one another included within one Form". Cf. also Prolcus In 
Pannenidem: (ET<:tv TTJV Twv l&wv µov<i8a µtav (887, 18); Kat yap tr>..fi8os Tliiv t&wv EV T(ii Evl ovn TT)V 
utr6oTacrtv ifxn v, ws EV µov<i8t Tov olKEi:ov apt6µ6v (636, 21-23): which means that the monad of the ideas is the One 
Being - this indicates a different interpretation of the Sophist, thus, Petritsi 's source here is not Proclus but somebody else, 
presumably Origen who defined the Son as l8ea l& wv in Contra Celsum. Moreover, in the Chaldean Oracles, quoted by 
Proclus in In Parmenidem 800,20-801,5 we find expressions (I ) NoOs traTpos Eppol(T]<Tf vo~cras aKµ<i8t l3ov>..1j traµ· 
µ6p<j>o1JS l8fos, TTTJ'Ylis 6€ µuis atro trdcrm E~E6opov ... (13) l wmaL VOc"pal TTTJ-yi'js traTptKi)s dtro ... (15) apxEyovous 
l8fos trpWTTJ traTpos l ~>..ooE Tacr& aUTOTEAT)S TTTJ'Yll· Petritsi, who knew Proclus' commentaries on Parmenides must 
have known aslo those logia, and have interpreted "paternal source" to be the Limit in his system ( cf. for instance his com-
mentary on prop. 151). This, however, is quite different from the interpretation of Proclus who identifies the "paternal 
source" with the Demiurgic Mind- holding quite a low rank in the intellectual realm. Petritsi 's interpretation or usage of the 
Oracle is radically different, for he interprets the vois' 1TaTptK6s and the TTTJYTI traTpLKT) as the Word of the Father, as the 
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"supra-idea" and the limiting Principle of everything, first of all of the henadic numbers. The different 
orders of henads receive their properties through participation in this limiting principle. Any number 
would have been infinite were not "the light of the One sewn in it"(§ 1,15.25-26). The transcendent One 
is described as the giver of limit to all, and It does so through the First Limit, viz. the second One5 
which he begets: "The One which derives from Hirn is the Principle of the series of henads" and "the 
participable cause in the series of henads", while the One is referred to as [something] "beyond Princi-
ple"6 and is posited above the henadic series (§116.158.7-15)7. We read that "before the multitude the 
One engenders the One and only then follow the series of the henads" (§29). The Limit is called the 
'First Number' (§30) which gives origin to the henadic series. The scheme corresponds to that held by 
the later Pythagoreans and Platonists, for "the monistic theory, involving as it does a distinction be-
tween the ideal One and the unit which begins the number series, is surely Platonic in character'8• The 
One is broader than the unifying principle, i.e., the second One it produces, that is why Petritsi declares 
the One to "transcend even the unity" (§56,123.16-17). That the One goes beyond Limit is evident, for 
instance, in a beautiful passage where the perpetually moving sky is described as a lover of the One: the 
movement of the sky has no end because its Beloved cannot be attained due to the fact that It "is above 
the Limit and Principle"9, for had the beloved a border or were It confined in limit the sky would have 
also stopped its ceaseless travel (§ 13,45.23-28). Petritsi, of course, never says that the One is beyond 
the Limit for the Limit itself, that is to say, that the One in unattainable in full also for the Limit. 
Moreover, he alludes twice to St. Paul, saying that the "Father manifests in the Son the entire fulness of 
His Divinity". However, Petritsi's adherrence to the hierarchical patterns and language of the Neopla-
tonic ontology can lead to a suggestion of a subordinationist view in his system.10 
The One produced by the One is the unifying Principle and cause of all (§56,123.17-18). Being the 
Super Idea it imposes idea upon all: "the First Limit eternally unifies, gives unity and idea" 
(§151,176.20-21). The Limit is called the "paternal source" (ibid.1.17): "this paternal being is produced 
before all the others by the Father of all", · and it "constructs all henads giving them limit and unity" 
(§151,176.25-29). To elucidate the meaning of this last sentence it is appropriate to examine the com-
mentary on prop.3 Here Petritsi teaches that everything that has unity but is not the One-itself is com-
Second One, that is, the highest possible principle after the Absolute God. The reasons for that may be that (1) for a Chris-
tian the Demiurge who creates the world is the highest God, thus his voiis or 1TT1Yl1 will be the Son; (2) Petritsi may have 
been influenced by the Biblical and Patristic sources, precisely, according to the interpretation of Capadocians, in the Psal-
mic verse "/Sn TTapa aot 'ITTl'Yfl (WTJS, iv•: :r<i} <j>wTl aou /51p6µE6a. c/>ws"(35,9) "you" (TTapa aot) means Father and the 
"Source of Life" the Son, who is also the Light of the Father, and in this Light shall we see Light, that is the Holy Spirit (this 
last Capadocian interpretation is taken over also by Petritsi in his "Epilogue"). Thus, if a Christian combines the two "Reve-
lations": the pagan logia and the Jewish-Christian logia, it is only logical to interpret the ''paternal source" as the Son. Inter-
estingly, Michael Psellus, who may have directly influenced Petritsi, identifies the ''paternal intellect" of the Oracles (108,1) 
with the Biblical Creator God (Psellus, 140). Furthermore, in De Civitate Dei, Augustine refers to Porphyry's commentary on 
the Oracles and identifies paterna mens, that is, vovs TTaTptK6s, with the God the Word. Thus, Petritsi relied on a long ex-
isting tradition in the Christian theology. 
5 I use italics to distinguish the "second One", that is, the Limit, from the absolute One. 
6 Proclus in his commentary on the Parmenides, in that part which is extant now only in the Latin translation of William of 
Moerbeke, refers to Speucipus' interpretation of the ''view of the Ancients" concerning palcing the One beyond the princi-
ple: "Et ut Speusippus-narans tamquam placentia antiquis-audit. quid dicit? 'Le unum enim melius ente putantes et a quo 
le ens, et ab ea que secundum principium habitudine liberaverunt ' " ( qoted from an article of Leonardo Taran: Proclus and 
the Old Academy, Colloques intemationaux du C.N.R.S. Proclus.-Lecteur et interprete des Anciens. Editions du C.N.R.S., 
Paris 1987, p 229). 
7 In this identification of the second One with the Limit, which is only implicit in the Elements (cf. prop. 89), Petritsi follows 
the Platonic Theology of Proclus. Cf. Tb µEv TOlvw lv To TTpolirrapxov -ms 8w<iµEws Kal TTp<iiTov aTTo Tijs o:µE-
6EKTou Kal a-yvwo-Tou Ttilv IS>.wv al Tlas TTpolirrocmiv, TTlpas b EV cl>tATll½ :fuKpaTTJS ciTToKa>-Ei:, TTJV 8€ yEvv-
TJTLKTJV TOO 0VToS 8waµtv OTTELplav. (Th.Pl. III.8. 2-5) _ . 
8 As Guthrie observes, it is more likely that initially Pytagoreans did not hold the conception of the ultimate One as the arche 
of all, but their doctrine was dualistic, i.e. the One derived from the two initial principles-Limit and Unlimited. Guthrie, 
History of Greek Philosophy, v. I. p.249. Cf.also Proclus' Th.PI.III,12,p.44,ln23-p.45,lnl2. where he speaks about the God-
Limit to derive from the highest unparticipated God. 
9 I capitalise the Limit and Principle, thinking that Petritsi refers here exactly to the First Limit and does not speak merely in 
general terms. . .. • ., . . . 
1° Cf. Michael Psellus, who in his commentaries on a Chaldean logion ( b TTOTTJP EaVTov TJPTTOO'EV ... Or.Chal.3) cntic1zes the 
pagan idea of the supreme Deity as unapproachable even to "His own power", that is to say, to His Son, from th~ Orthodox-
Trinitarian viewpoint: b !!fV voiis TOO Xoylou TotoiiTos, ws b lrr\. TTaVTwv 8E6s, &.;- 611 Kal TTaTT)p wv6µacrrnt, 
ciKOTCIATJTTTOV E"QVTOV TTOLEL KOL OTTEplAT)TTTOV, OU µ6vov ,:ars TTPIJlTaLS Kal , &u,;~paLS toornt Ka\. T?;LS ~µ1.: -
nfpats l/Juxars, tiMo. Kal ai,tjj nj l6lq. 8uv<iµEL. 8waµts & TOO TTaTpos _o llL6s. , EQVT0~ ,'YCIP PTJO'LV i;pTTam,v 
0 TTaTT)p' ciTTo TTOO'TJS cpooEws. oilK fon 8€ TO 86-yµa b~ov. lv Tl!) ul<j> yap TTap T]µtv o TTUTT)p 6E8oy-
µ<iTtO'Tat , WO'TTEP Kal b u'tos EV Tlj> TTaTpL Kal opos TOO TTaTpbs o ulos Ka\. 8{i:os Myas UTTE Pc/>lJTJS (Psellus, 141 ). 
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posed of parts which participate in each other in order to constitute a certain essence: e.g. parts of "five" 
participate in each other and compose the essence of five. "Five", as well as any other number taken in 
its counting function, denotes the nurnber of units it counts, and thus is viewed in relation to those units. 
As "fiveness", however, it has no more a counting function but is already an idea and essence. Parts of 
the "flveness" are now not simple arbitrary units, five in nurnber, to be readily applied to any other 
multitude, but each of them receives a certain· qualification, a "label" of that genus, viz. the "fiveness". 
So each number appears in this sense as a certain integral structure. Petritsi makes an analogy with the 
term "man", for it also must consist of several parts: animality, reason, mortality, etc. Those parts are in 
man not in a simple and autonomous way, but man possesses man-type animality pertaining precisely to 
his genus (pp. 24-25). This act of defining of a multitude of units and parts according to a certain genus, 
is the property of the Limit, which provides idea to all. This act takes place on different levels, because 
as Petritsi says there are three orders of nurnbers: natural, arithmetical and theological (metaphysical). 
The natural numbers are likely to refer to nurnbers viewed in nature, e.g. everything in nature, for in-
stance a tree, is a number of roots, stems, branches, leaves etc.; the arithmetical numbers probably de-
note numbers taken as devices for numbering, that is, in their counting function, whereas the meta-
physical numbers could be applied to numbers taken in their essence, an integral "three" or integral 
"seven". Metaphysical numbers, which seem to denote henads11, are the principles of metaphysical 
ideas which have essential existence in the sphere of the True Being, called by Petritsi "the place of 
ideas" (§57,125.2).12 Henads in fact are simpler than ideas, because the ideas are preceded by and com-
posed of henadic numbers. With the words of Lossev: "the henads are principles of ideality itself 13. 
This superiority of the henads is confirmed also by Petritsi: "The Good can be viewed either in ideas or 
in composition of beings, or above ideas, i.e. in the henadic sphere" (§28, 76,24-25). All the other enti-
ties are number of something other than indivisible units, for example, the human body is a number of 
hands, eyes, fingers which are not themselves simple, whereas "divine numbers" (as Petritsi calls 
henads) are comprised of such simple, indivisible units, which the Limit being "the first and super idea 
of ideas" (§90, 142.31-32) constructs and qualifies within proper numbers. 
"Let us take any number of multitude, be it hundred: each separate [unit] of the monads and num-
bers14 in the hundred is one (unit), but the "hundredness" puts idea on those units and makes them be-
long to its genus. And also "hundredness" is one and one-like. Look, how the One gave Its property to 
all-both to each of the parts and to the wholeness" (1. 11, 15-20); 
shortly below Petritsi writes that this participation in unity is possible for everything through the 
"unitary limit": "Everything has both its wholeness and parts from the One, and all are circumscribed 
by unitary limit" (ibid.15,34-36). 
The Limit in Petritsi's system is explicitly identified with the second hypostasis of the Trinity, 
the Son. In the 29th commentary he alludes to the Apostle Paul who called the Son the image of the 
One15 (here again the One is identified with the Father), and, continues Petritsi, this firstborn Word, 
which precedes all beings and henads the philosopher (Aristotle) calls "the idea of ideas" (§29,78.8-15). 
In the following commentary Petritsi again returns to the Limit, the "first Number and head of ideas" 
citing S.ocrates' saying "'the first measure measured all and the first Limit limited all'16, and-so Petritsi 
adds-we have just (that is, in the previous commentary) called that Limit the Son". We also read that 
"the first Word of the One established ideas in the dimension of eternity", i.e. in the sphere of ideas 
(§24,68.6-7). All the corporeal ideas are just reflections of lights issuing from the "head of ideas (the 
Limit) which is born from the One as One and as the Principle of henads" (§41,98.18-20). When those 
lights draw back and diminish, the matter darkens arid changes one shape into another. 
11 It is also possible that metaphysical numbers directly denote metaphysical ideas, for sometimes (e.g. in §198) Petritsi 
equates numbers with ideas, as elsewhere he equates numbers with beings (§64). 
12 Cf. Aristotle. De Anima 429a27-soul as topos eidon, and also Proclus In Parmenidem 930.11 : T6mis yap aimiiv (i.e. Twv 
l&<.iiv) tanv b voiis'. 
13 Lossev, Commentaries on the Elements o/Theology, in History of Antique Aesthetics, p.448. 
14 Those 'monads and numbers' must be taken as atomic units for otherwise there will be an infinite regress and, hence, noth-
ing to be circumscribed for the idea of"hundred". 
15 Cf. cor.4.4."who is the image of God" (The Bible, New International Version), and Col.1.15."He is the image of the invisible 
God ... ". 
16 Cf Philebus, 25b. ("And what of... ... anything else which has the ratio of number to number, or measure to measure? All 
these, I believe, we should do well reckon as in the class of Limit.") Cf. also Philebus, 64d-e (where Socrates says that no 
mixture could be sustained ifit lacks measure.) and Laws, Book IV, 716c4:'_'In our eyes God will be measure of.all things". 
However the last two passages do not apply directly to the peras. 
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The Infinity 
If the .One ~d the Limit are respectiv~ly the Father and the Son, it is only plausible to su~pose that 
the Infimty which has a parallel ontological status with the Limit, refers to the Holy Spirit1 • Though 
Petritsi never makes this identification explicit, the text, as I shall demonstrate, provides good grounds 
for this assertion. Infinity appears as the principle of multiplication and birthgiving (§151,178.18-19; 
§ 152,179 .4-5). 
In contradistinction to the Limit, which is the 'paternal cause' Infinity is the maternal source and 
"the infinite power for the multiplication of all things" (ibid.). Unlike the Limit, Infinity is the principle 
of even (artios) henads. Alluding to Pythagoras Petritsi says that "two (even) is always a cause of infin-
ity, whereas "three" is a cause of limit"18 (§152,177.7-9). Contrary to the Limit, which is the shaping 
and, so to say, status-giving source, the First Infinity is the dynamic principle, the cause of ceaseless 
change.
19 
In terms of metaphysical structw'es, this change means procession of effect from cause. In his 
commentary to prop.29 Petritsi speaks about the two causes of derivation of effects from their causes-
likeness and difference. The "likeness" in this passage applies to the First Limit and in the "difference" 
which is the "birthgiving cause" (29,79.4) in virtue of which each of the series is differentiated and 
multiplied (ibid. 11-12), we can recognize the First Infinity. The same thought recurs in the commen-
tary to prop.125, where we read that henads proceed through the two causes, that is likeness and differ-
ence, of which the first is the one which sustains the effects within their causes, the second is the "mul-
tiplier" (§163,163.15-19). 
The First Infinity is constantly rendered as "power"; it is a "non-diminishing and limitless power" 
(§ 10,37,20); the "analkestati power, ceaseless in virtue of its infinity" (§90, 145.12). It seems strange 
that Petritsi characterizes Infinity by the Greek adjective "analkestati", which in fact means "the most 
powerless". The clue for this might be found in the philosopher's discourse about the One or the Good; 
he makes an allusion to "Timaeus"20 and states that the One poured out like an overfilled cup, with pur-
pose to enable also others take share in Its goodness, for "the Goodness is free of envy, and is not to be 
confined due to Its powerlessness, for It transcends powers"(§25,68.26-30). Usage of "powerlessness" 
in the superlative sense probably points to the fact that any power has a measure, and measure is a 
limitation which does not apply to the One. Thus, powerlessness seems to imply that the One acts with-
out efforts, of which analogy is the effortless shining of the sun. In this light the adjective "analkestati" 
in reference with the Infinity can be. interpreted as "the most effortless". At this point it seems that we 
encounter a clear superiority of the Orte in relation to the Infinity: the First One is absolutely "power-
free" , while the First Infinity is already a power, though "analkestati" power. The First Infinity appears 
to be the "first power", originating the series of infinite powers: "the first infinite power excels all other 
powers, the latter having their existence in virtue of the former" (§90,143.31-33), but the One as Petritsi 
emphasises is higher than any series, thus over above being the first (cf.§56,123.17; §60,127.20), and, 
thus, also above the series of powers. 
As we have said, Petritsi never identifies the First Infinity with the Holy Spirit directly, but in the 
"Epilogue" where he writes about the vision of the Trinty in the Psalms, he refers to the Holy Spirit in a 
language similar to that applied to the First Infinity in the commentaries. The specific, personal charac-
teristic of the Holy Spirit in the "Epilogue" is "power". In the very beginning of the "Epilogue" Petritsi 
states that the Father "will give us the kingdom of His hand which is the Son, and will communicate to 
us the power which issues from Him, which is the Spirit" (207 .16-17), or another passage: "the 'power' 
denotes the Above Holy Spirit, which gives holiness to the heavenly powers" (210.8-9). In the com-
mentaries Petritsi describes the First Infinity as "the non-diminishing power for the preservation of be-
ings" (§90,143.2-3), and in the "Epilogue":. . . . . . . 
11 
"essence of the beings is preserved and mamtamed m the Son by the Spmt of God, which 1s the Power 
(210.8-14). 
17 In order to maintain the Trinitarian model, Petritsi makes Limit and Infinity parallel principles.In this he differs from Pro-
clus who posits the Limit explicitly above Infinity (Cf. Th.Pl. Ill.8.2-5); also, In Timaeum, l,pp.176,6-177,2 (Diehl): Ka\. µT] 
L6Lc1 'TO'irrov oll)ll<ilµEv Tov M-yov, (m 8T) T<XS lipx~s Twv 1rpayµciTwv, 8q1p11µ,lvas 0ETfov, Ka\. TO.S 800 Tavra~ 
avOToLxlas bµo-yvlotJS' <fxxµlv · lTpol)yE~TaL 'YC':_P TO lv a1ra.011s i vaVTLWO"EWS, ws Ka\. olllvfuy6pnol <f,aaLV. A'M 
flTfl Kal µETa µlav ahtav Tl 8va.s TWV apxwv avE<Pa.Vll, Ka\. EV TaUTaLs Tl µova.s KpElTTWV n,s- 8va.8oc;). 
1s In Pytagoras' teaching "two" was a symbol of difference, division, whereas "~hree" of perfection, for three components: be-
ginning, middle and end makes thing perfect. Porphyry, Life of Pytagoras. pp.49-51 . . 
19 Cf. fon BE Kal &ta · Boos 8waµLs li1rnpos. (wl'js 1rpo68os aviKMLlTToS' - In: New Fragments from Iambl1chus, ed. 
D. O'Meara. American Journal of Philology, Vol.102, 1981, p.39. 
20 Timaeus, 29e. 
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The two ultimate principles-Limit and Infinity-permeate the whole universe; their activity starts 
on the level of the henads, then proceeds to the True Being, which possesses "infinite power as being 
established by the First Infinity, and is one, but not a particular idea, given that it is unified and per-
fected by the First Limit." (§89,142.19-22); From there on the two sources go down to the intellects and 
intelligent beings, souls, nature and at last, to corporeal essences (§159,180.29-181.3). For instance, 
Infinity is present in perishable beings in their faculty of reproduction, and it is perceived even in the 
prime matter, insofar as it is something deprived of all limits (§94,144.30-145.2). Every essence should 
contain those two elements, but in some of them the infinite principle prevails, in others the limiting 
principle. For example, each of the henadic numbers must participate in the Limit, for the very essence 
of number is imposition of limit on an indefinite multitude of units, but some henads (the even num-
bers) are of the genus of the Infinity, the others (the odd numbers) are of the genus of the Limit. This 
pattern goes down the to corporeal essences; even among the four qualities of the elements two are pas-
sive and two active: heat and coolness are active and forming principles, which means that they are of 
the paternal and limiting genus, whereas humidity and dryness are receptive and maternal, and hence 
belong to the genus of Infinity (§152,177.9-15). At last, the prime matter has also a certain kind of 
limitation being confined in the "fetters of unity" (124, 12), and it is infinite as deprived of any definable 
essence. Below I provide a summary list of the properties and faculties applied to the Limit and Infinity 






rational (principle of ideas) 
active 





dynamic (principle of powers) 
passive 
In the basic metaphysical process consisting of three fundamental aspects-procession, remaining 
and reversion-the One, the Limit and Infinity have their discrete functions. According to Proclus any 
effect at the same time proceeds from its cause, remains in its cause and returns to its own cause (if it 
has any). In the perspective of the metaphysical levels, each of which has its own monadic cause-the 
psychic series its monadic. universal Soul, intellectual series its monadic universal Intellect-each series 
appears to be an unfolding of this monadic cause, that is to say, its multiplication. The specific cause for 
the procession and multiplication is Infinity; the specific cause for safeguarding of each particular 
member of series in its proper steadfast identity is Limit; eventually, the specific cause for unification of 
the whole series through reversion of all the effects to their monadic cause is the transcendent One. 
Petritsi here provides an original theory of "three Ones". The first One, which is beyond all series is the 
transcendent One, the Father; the next One, which is called ''the multiplied One" is the procession or 
multiplication of the transcendent One - the Infinity, the Spirit; eventually the "One of the proper na-
tures", that is to say the One immanent in each particular being is to be identified with the Limit, the 
Son. A gloss in one of the manuscripts across the passage where Petritsi describes his "three Ones the-
ory" reads: "learn for the Holy Trinity". The gloss probably belongs to an attentive reader of Petritsi. 
However, one can suppose that it is Petritsi's own note. 
Concluding remarks 
Petritsi' s schematic and functional description of the Trinity-not only the assimilation but the entire 
identification of the Christian dogma with a modified Proclian Neo-Platonic scheme-does not seem to 
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reflect the traditional Orthodox teaching.21 Yet, this requires a detailed analysis of Petritsi 's patristic 
Byzantine sources which goes beyond the scope of the present paper. Clearly, indeed, there are at least 
apparent traits of subordionationist Trinitarianism in Petritsi, which must be caused by the fact that 
Petritsi does not abandon Neoplatonist language and metaphysical framework. 
There are, however, passages that depict Trinity without looming of any subordinationism. Eventu-
ally, I adduce a quotation of one of such passages coming from Petritsi's Epilogue where he provides a 
nice musical analogy for the Trinity: 
Our beloved book [the Psalms] is altogether a music embellished by the Holy Spirit, and in music 
there are also three phtongs,22 that is to say, tonalities which make one whole. They are "mzakhr" 
[strained, high pitch], •~ir" [middle] and "barn" [lower tension, bass], and all arrangements of strings 
and voices make a beautiful melody by those three, for any composition is beautiful through its irregu-
larities. You would perceive the same in the number of the Holy Trinity, for we speak about the Father 
being unborn, the birth of the Son, the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the unity of the Nature, with 
the difference of the Hypostases. Similarly in different musical tonalities-"mzachr," "jir" and 
"bam"-we perceive the unity of a whole (Epilogue 217. 1-14). 
21 . f the seventeenth-century readers of Petritsi 's commentaries, a certain Christephore, who, ac-
lt is ~ot by chan~_that ;: ';ranashvili is Katholikos Christephore Udrubegashvili, put a leaf with his remark in_o~e of the 
cordmg ~o the opm1on o . ~ . o~ the a e where Petritsi identifies the metaphysical Limit with the Christian Son: 
~uscnpts. o~ the comm:=:s~::\aid ... iii! philosopher calls [Him] Limit of Limits and Idea of Ideas, as Paul call~ ;:i] ~~u~:ha':i~ ~ge ~ho has in Himself the richness of the Father. This chapter reveals the blasphemy even more. 
Joane Petritsi, Opera, I, p. lxxn. 
22 Greek: 4>86-yyo<; - "voice." 
